Theology / Hard Questions • Difficult Questions • Academic
Divine Deception and Hidden Purposes
Primary question: If God permits horrendous evils for reasons we cannot discern, is God thereby engaged in something functionally indistinguishable from deception, and does skeptical theism collapse our ability to trust our moral and epistemic judgments generally?
Argument map
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Common mistakes
Don't say
Treating skeptical theism as a complete theodicy that explains why God allows evil.
Instead
Present it strictly as a defensive move against one specific argument (Rowe's evidential inference), leaving the existential and pastoral question of suffering largely untouched.
Don't say
Dismissing Wielenberg's deception objection as merely rhetorical.
Instead
Acknowledge it as a serious, unresolved tension that responsible use of skeptical theism must limit and qualify, not wave away.
Don't say
Assuming skeptical theism requires abandoning all confident moral judgments.
Instead
Distinguish the narrow theodicy-specific skepticism from ordinary first-order moral knowledge, while admitting the boundary is contested.
What would change my mind? — Christian position
A demonstration that the local/global skepticism distinction cannot be principledly maintained would push a thoughtful theist toward alternative responses to evil (soul-making, free will, greater-goods theodicies) that do not rely on radical inscrutability.
What would change my mind? — Skeptical position
A successful, non-question-begging theodicy identifying plausible God-justifying reasons for specific horrendous evils would remove the need for skeptical theism altogether and substantially strengthen the theistic case.
Why does this matter?
How one handles this question shapes whether appeals to divine mystery are principled philosophy or an unfalsifiable escape hatch, and it bears directly on how believers process real horrors: whether trusting God amid inexplicable suffering is intellectually honest humility or a demand to trust a being whose character has become opaque.
For further study
Primary and secondary sources on both sides of this question. Reading the strongest opposing case is part of the work, not a concession.
The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism — William Rowe
The founding statement of the modern evidential argument from evil.
The Evidential Argument from Evil — Ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder
A key anthology collecting Wykstra, Rowe, and other central exchanges.
Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies — Erik Wielenberg
The sharpest formulation of the divine deception objection.
Skeptical Theism: New Essays — Ed. Trent Dougherty and Justin McBrayer
A comprehensive contemporary volume surveying the debate from multiple angles.
The Nature of Necessity and related essays — Alvin Plantinga
Background on the free will defense as a distinct, less skepticism-dependent theistic response to evil.