Evil · Objection
Even if suffering is compatible with God, it is much more probable on atheism than on theism, so it counts as evidence against God.
Why people find it persuasive
This evidential argument (Paul Draper, William Rowe) does not claim a logical contradiction. It claims that the pattern of pain and pleasure we observe fits indifference better than benevolence.
Important distinctions
- • Logical compatibility versus probabilistic support.
- • Prior probability of theism versus the likelihood of evidence.
- • What other evidence also bears on the question.
Christian response
- • Probabilistic arguments depend on priors and on all the evidence. Cosmological, moral, and historical arguments could outweigh the evidential effect of suffering.
- • Skeptical theism notes that we may lack the capacity to see all of God's reasons, so the inference from 'I see no reason' to 'there is none' is weak.
- • Christian theism predicts that the world is fallen and that God is working to redeem it, which lowers the surprise of suffering relative to a simple 'omnibenevolent designer' hypothesis.
- • Cumulative case apologetics holds that a worldview must be assessed as a whole.
Strongest version of the objection
Even if suffering is compatible with God, it is much more probable on atheism than on theism, so it counts as evidence against God.
Christian counterresponse
Theists can accept that evil lowers the probability of generic theism but argue that specific Christian doctrine and other evidence raise it again.
Remaining questions
The size of the evidential effect and the force of skeptical theism are still debated in philosophy of religion.
Related arguments
For further study
Primary and secondary sources on both sides of this question. Reading the strongest opposing case is part of the work, not a concession.
God, Freedom, and Evil — Alvin Plantinga
The short book that ended the logical problem of evil as a formal disproof; still the place to start.
The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? — David Bentley Hart
A theological rejection of tidy theodicies that still refuses to concede the argument from evil.
The Evidential Argument from Evil — Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.)
The core academic exchange on evidential (not logical) arguments from evil, with Rowe and Wykstra in dialogue.
Wandering in Darkness — Eleonore Stump
A book-length treatment using biblical narrative rather than abstraction to address suffering.
Arguing about Evil — William Rowe (collected papers)
The best atheistic evidential argument from apparently pointless suffering, stated by its foremost defender.