Every religion has miracle stories, healings, and reports of divine intervention — Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and pagan traditions all report comparable phenomena, so Christian miracle claims carry no special evidential weight and simply reflect universal human credulity.

Why people find it persuasive

If miracle reports are common across all religious traditions and cultures, then the mere existence of such reports in Christianity can't be used to single it out as true, since the same style of argument would 'prove' mutually incompatible religions simultaneously.

Important distinctions

• • The bare fact that miracle reports exist across cultures vs. the specific evidential quality, proximity to events, and corroboration of particular reported miracles.
• • Miracles that merely display extraordinary power vs. miracles embedded in a specific, checkable historical and theological framework (fulfilled prophecy, bodily resurrection with a body count of witnesses).
• • Using miracle claims as the sole basis for a religion's truth vs. as cumulative corroborating evidence within a larger case.
• • All religious traditions being equally well-evidenced vs. all containing some extraordinary claims.

Christian response

• • The objection trades on treating 'miracle claim' as a single undifferentiated category, but evidential quality varies enormously: a vague healing testimony transmitted orally for centuries in a culture with no interest in eyewitness verification is not evidentially equivalent to multiply-attested, early, specific claims tied to named individuals, datable events, and public consequences (like the resurrection appearances to over 500 people at once per 1 Corinthians 15, written within about 25 years of the event and incorporating creedal material even earlier). The mere existence of the category 'miracle claim' elsewhere does no work toward assessing the specific evidence for any particular claim.
• • Christian apologetics does not typically argue 'miracles happened, therefore Christianity is true' as an isolated inference from the bare category of the miraculous; the argument is cumulative — a specific, well-attested miracle (the resurrection) occurring within a specific redemptive-historical context (fulfilled messianic expectation, an empty tomb, transformed and willing-to-die witnesses, the otherwise inexplicable rise of a resurrection-centered movement from Jewish monotheists) that other religious miracle traditions typically do not offer as a comparably integrated package.
• • It is also simply false that all religious traditions treat miracle reports the same evidentially; many traditions freely acknowledge their miracle stories function symbolically, hagiographically, or didactically rather than as claims to historical fact intended to ground the entire truth of the religion, whereas the New Testament authors explicitly stake the truth of the Christian claim on a falsifiable, physical event (1 Corinthians 15:14-19 — 'if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile') in a way not paralleled by most comparanda.
• • That other traditions contain extraordinary or miraculous elements is actually compatible with mere general revelation, common human religious experience of a genuinely transcendent reality, demonic or psychological phenomena, or simply false reports — a Christian need not deny that unusual, even unexplained, things happen in other religious contexts to maintain that a particular event, well evidenced, uniquely vindicates a particular claim (the resurrection vindicating Jesus's own specific, checkable claims about himself).
• • Comparative religion scholarship itself does not treat all miracle-claim traditions as evidentially equal; historians assess each on its own textual, chronological, and corroborative merits, which is exactly the individualized scrutiny this objection tries to short-circuit by lumping everything into one dismissible bucket labeled 'miracle stories'.

Christian counterresponse

This is a fair point about base rates, and it is why serious Christian apologetics does not rest on the resurrection being merely 'well-attested' in isolation, but argues that the specific combination of factors (empty tomb, transformed skeptics like Paul and James, the movement's willingness to die rather than recant under circumstances offering strong incentive to recant, the criterion of embarrassment in details like women as first witnesses) resists the standard psychological explanations (grief hallucination, legendary development, wishful thinking) better than comparison cases do — the case has to be evaluated on its particulars, which is exactly what a fair application of the 'other religions have miracles too' objection should also require of itself before generalizing.